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FOREWORD
A sustainable national security strategy is feasible
only when directed by a sustainable national security
policy. In the absence of policy guidance, strategy has
to be meaningless. The only policy that meets both
the mandates of American culture and the challenges
of the outside world is one that seeks to promote the
necessary mission of guarding and advancing world
order.
Dr. Colin Gray considers and rejects a policy that
would encourage the emergence of a multipolar structure for global politics. He argues that multipolarity
not only would fail to maintain order, it would also
promote conflict among the inevitably rival great
powers. In addition, he suggests that Americans
culturally are not comfortable with balance-of-power
politics and certainly would not choose to promote the
return of such a system.
The monograph identifies the various “pieces of
the puzzle” most relevant to national security strategy;
surfaces the leading assumptions held by American
policymakers and strategists; considers alternative
national security policies; and specifies the necessary
components of a sustainable national security strategy.
Dr. Gray concludes that America has much less
choice over its policy and strategy than the public
debate suggests. He warns that the country’s dominant
leadership role in global security certainly will be
challenged before the century is old.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
What should be the U.S. national security strategy
after Iraq? An answer cannot be given unless a logically
and politically prior question is posed: “What should
be the purpose and character of a sustainable U.S.
national security policy after Iraq?” Thus to answer the
first question, one has to identify both the policy that
strategy must serve as well as the components of that
strategy.
Unfortunately for the convenience and self-confidence of defense planners, although the 21st century
presents no great difficulty to America over its choice
of national security policy, the selection of a suitable
strategy is a far more difficult task. The challenge is
cultural and material. U.S. national culture favors both a
somewhat disengaged stance towards the world beyond
North America, as well as the active promotion of such
leading American values as freedom, democracy, and
open markets. On the material side, the country faces
an exceptionally wide range of actual and potential
threats to its vital interests by historical standards. On
the one hand, there are nonstate terrorists and other
insurgents of an Islamist Jihadist persuasion who
could threaten the stability of the global economy by
menacing commercial access to oil, and who may well
acquire a few weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
On the other hand, the new century appears certain to
see the rise of some current regional powers to a yet
greater category, China and India specifically. When
we add in current uncertainty about the future course
of Russian policy, the European Union as a possible
super state, as well as the future roles of Japan and
Iran, it becomes readily apparent that the years ahead
offer few certainties regarding U.S. threat priorities.
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U.S. national security policy can be sustainable only
if it meets domestic cultural standards as well as the
externally-based demands to which American leaders
must respond out of a prudent concern for protection
of national interests. Therefore, it is necessary to
appreciate the domain of necessity or nearly such, both
domestic and foreign. U.S. policy and strategy have to
satisfy in two markets, at home and abroad.
Scholars debate whether American culture, or
a supposedly “objective” foreign material reality,
ultimately commands policy and strategy. The debate
is foolish. In practice, Americans attempt what they
are able, as they perceive and interpret international
conditions, in a manner that cannot help reflecting
American cultural influence.
In order to identify a sustainable national security
strategy, it is essential to recognize, and take due
account of, the whole hierarchy of relevant ideas and
behavior. To specify, the strategy in question here is
conditioned by the following factors:
• Perceived state of the world
• U.S. role in the world
• Policy
• National security strategy
• Military strategy
• Military forces.
With which major working assumptions are
American policymakers and strategists forearmed?
Individuals undoubtedly will dissent in some detail
from any particular listing, but the following is a
plausible summary of the principal assumptions that
equip the senior ranks of America’s national security
policymaking community:
• War is endemic in the human condition. Though
it is culturally American to be generically
vi
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•
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hopeful, U.S. defense planners cannot, and do
not, assume that the 21st century will witness
the end of war.
Warfare will both evolve and appear in several forms.
Future hostilities will be regular and irregular;
among states as well as states and nonstate
political entities. Radically new technologies
will impact warfare of all kinds.
Global order is a meaningful concept; such order has
to be policed by someone or something. Theories
of order promotion abound; most are illusory.
The alternative to order is disorder, and the
spectrum from tolerable order to intolerable
disorder is not usually smoothly linear; it is
marked eccentrically by tipping points. Also,
order–disorder is a condition that applies
across several dimensions of global affairs, for
example economic-financial as well as militarystrategic. As a general rule, the path to ruin will
be unmistakably apparent only in hindsight.
War entails warfare, and warfare always is about
fighting. America’s armed forces must excel
in warfare of all kinds, regular and irregular.
This is not to say, however, that the two are of
equal importance; they are not. The country
should continue to accord top priority to its
military prowess in interstate warfare, even
if that prospective combat is anticipated to be
significantly asymmetrical.
New first-class competitors/enemies will emerge
(indeed, are emerging already). The relatively few
years since 1991 have been remarkable in world
politics for the absence of a state or coalition able
to balance the U.S. superpower. They have not
been remarkable as heralding a revolution in
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the functioning of that politics. Of recent years,
no one has been strong enough to constrain
the United States. Such a power would, and
predictably will, attract follower-states in due
course. World order in the 21st century will
not be overseen by an executive committee of
the rather virtual world community, led by an
ever comfortably dominant America. If that
benign arrangement truly were in the offing, it
would be manifest in the behavior and norms
of the United Nations Security Council. It is not.
Rising states such as China and India are on a
collision course with each other and possibly
with the United States. Emerging regional great
powers, let alone new super states, will accept
U.S. leadership in some security matters only if
that leadership serves their national interest in
helping to offset the strength of regional rivals.
The structure of relative power and influence,
by region and globally, is dynamic. If a state,
even a superpower, is not rising it is very likely
to be falling. History has not come to a happy
conclusion with American dominance.
• Surprise happens. There are unknowns, and even
“unknown unknowns,” in America’s future,
as a recent Secretary of Defense observed
with eloquent opaqueness. A sustainable U.S.
national security strategy needs to be surpriseproofed in the sense of being robust when
confronted with the unexpected. Given the
range of radical new technologies with potential
military applications that should mature in the
21st century, and given a predictable context
of international rivalry or worse, U.S. defense
planners are obliged to favor flexibility and
adaptability.
viii

U.S. policy to provide purpose and political
guidance to U.S. strategy in the future is usefully
approachable by identifying four fairly distinctive
alternative American roles in the world. These are
readily characterized as follows:
1. Hegemon-leader for global guardianship
2. Anti-hegemonial offshore balancer and spoiler
3. Disengaged lone wolf
4. Moderate competitor and partner in a multipolar
world.
Of the four nominal choices, only the first is truly
practicable at present and in the near-term future. The
partnership in multipolarity, an idea that appeals to
many scholars, is flawed in that the non-American
“poles” are not yet ready for prime time. Furthermore,
even if this were not the case, a genuinely multipolar
world would be prone to great power wars. The
rich strategic history of multipolarity is far from
encouraging. The role of “disengaged lone wolf”
simply could not work. The United States is engaged in
world affairs by economic, environmental, and hence
political and potentially strategic, globalization. To be
disengaged would be to decline to protect one’s vital
interests. Moreover, America’s national culture, though
marked by a longing for disengagement, also strongly
favors political missionary behavior. This latter value
rises and falls irregularly, but it always rises again.
The United States could try to effect a transition
from its current on-shore Eurasian strategy of forward
deployment, to an off-shore posture keyed to a
policy role as “spoiler” of potential grand continental
coalitions. As maritime-air-space balancer of large
Eurasian menaces, the United States would both retain
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its political discretion over belligerency and favor its
national strength in the higher technology features of
its armed forces. The problem is that this off-shore role
would not suffice to defend the national interest. The
country would not be trusted, since it would eschew
the firm commitments that require local presence. As
much to the point, U.S. influence would be certain to
diminish as a consequence of a process of withdrawal,
no matter how impressive the reach of America’s
weapons through the several geographies of the great
“commons.”
Almost by default, the United States should choose,
perhaps simply accept, the role of hegemon-leader for a
world order that serves both its own most vital interests
as well as those of a clear majority of members of the
world community, such as it is. Contrary to the sense of
much of the contemporary debate, Americans have no
prudent alternative other than to play the hegemonic
role. But for the role to be sustainable, it has to rest
upon the formal or tacit consent of other societies. Only
with such consent will America be able to exercise a
national security strategy geared successfully to the
ordering duty.
What are the components of a sustainable national
security strategy, given the necessity for a guiding
policy whose overarching purpose is to protect the
national interest by defending world order globally?
Such a strategy must be refined and adapted to specific
cases, but these are its generic constituents:
1. Control of the global commons (sea, air, space,
cyberspace), when and where it is strategically essential.
2. The ability to dissuade, deter, defeat, or at least largely
neutralize any state, coalition of states, or nonstate political
actor, that threatens regional or global order.
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3. Adaptable and flexible strategy, operations, tactics,
logistics, and forces. Future wars and warfare will
occur all along the spectrum of regularity-irregularity.
Asymmetry will be the norm, not the exception, even
in regular conventional hostilities.
4. Continuing supremacy in regular conventional
combat. Prediction of a strategic future that will be
wholly irregular is almost certainly a considerable
exaggeration.
5. Competence in counterinsurgency (COIN) and
counterterror (CT). These activities should not dominate American defense preparation and action, but
they comprise necessary military, inter alia, core competencies.
6. Excellence in raiding, thus exploiting the leverage
of America’s global reach.
7. First-rate strategic theory and strategic and military
doctrine. Ideas are more important than machines, up
to a point at least.
8. A national security, or grand, strategy worthy of
the name, in which military strategy can be suitably
“nested.”
9. Policy choices and tactical military habits that do not
offend American culture.
10. A fully functioning “strategy bridge” that binds
together, adaptably, the realms of policy and military
behavior.
Our analysis concludes by identifying five farreaching points of great concern. First, the preferred
option, truly the necessary choice, for the United
States in the world, here called “hegemony-primacylight,” is a policy condition, not a strategy. Americans
have proved vulnerable to the temptation to leap
from policy selection to military operations, largely
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neglecting the essential levels of grand strategy and
military strategy.
Second, a definite strategy needs a definite enemy.
This reality all but encourages oversimplification.
America can wage war against al-Qaeda, but not
against “terror.” Because the identity of most of the
country’s future enemies is uncertain, it must suffice
to ensure that the “components” from which definite
strategies would be constructed are always ready
for play when the strategy coach calls on them to
perform.
Third, the United States needs to beware of false
alternatives for its policy and strategy. In defense
of its national interests, the country has no prudent
alternatives other than to play the hegemonic role
for as long as it is able. Similarly, there is no sensible
alternative to some on-shore entanglements in Eurasia, though assuredly Americans should strive to
succeed more by raiding than by intervening in, and
occupying, alien territory. There are and will be cases
when American boots must grind local dust. However,
the U.S. hegemon should seek to tread as lightly as the
mission permits, lest its effort triggers a self-defeating
“blowback” from an outraged and formerly neutral
local population. Unfortunately, more often than not
strategic and political effectiveness are much enhanced
when the military has overwhelming force and applies
it.
Fourth, belatedly Washington has learned what a
handful of scholars, not to mention the World War II
generation of policymakers, knew, i.e., that culture as
a force must never be underestimated. Understanding
of one’s own culture as well as the culture of others
can make the difference between success and failure in
policy, strategy, operations, and tactics.
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Fifth, America must understand that its dominant
role in many dimensions of world affairs increasingly
will be challenged by those whose interests, anxieties,
and honor are challenged by the U.S. hegemony. No
matter how gingerly this hegemony is manifested in
U.S. behavior, it will be resented and opposed.
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AFTER IRAQ:
THE SEARCH FOR A SUSTAINABLE NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY
If American hegemony is the answer, what was the
question?
Anonymous
Thus it is said that one who knows the enemy and
knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred
engagements. One who does not know the enemy but
knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes
meet with defeat. One who knows neither the enemy
nor himself will invariably be defeated in every
engagement.
Sun-tzu, ca. 400BC, 19941
In the 5th century, it was dawning on the Roman world,
especially Constantinople, that theirs was but one state
among many: a perception which contrasted with
the 4th-century view that Rome comprised the entire
civilized world.
Ross Laidlaw, 20072

Introduction: Home and Abroad.
Strategy and policy are not synonymous. However,
a sustainable strategy can serve only a sustainable
policy. If the latter oscillates, the former becomes
impractical. This monograph targets primarily
the national, or grand, strategic level of analysis,
but it cannot ignore the challenge of ascertaining
and sustaining a coherent national security policy.
Carelessly or for stylistic variety, many politicians,
analysts, and commentators employ the terms policy
and strategy interchangeably.3 This malpractice does
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not scar these pages. The distinction matters crucially
and needs to be maintained rigorously. Policy sets
goals, indeed may well change goals, while strategy
is always instrumental. In the absence of a reasonably
stable policy, strategy becomes literally meaningless; it
must lack political direction.
The first epigraph above highlights both the core of
the contemporary debate about America’s place in the
world, and reminds people of the need to be clear about
the underlying purpose behind a sweeping policy goal.
The discussion that follows addresses both the national
and the international levels of analysis. It probes the
probable structure and functioning of global politics as
well as America’s role. This is not an exercise in the
academic study of International Relations, but it cannot
be denied that it must bear directly, and draw upon,
a major debate within the international community
of scholars.4 Specifically, scholars of International
Relations are debating energetically the respective
and relative influence of the material structure of the
international system of states (very largely), as opposed
to the potency of domestic cultures (national, strategic,
and military-institutional).5 For once, academics are
focusing on an issue area that has immense meaning
for U.S. policy and strategy. In fact, widespread expert
misunderstanding of the relationship between what
one can summarize for convenience as power and
culture is misleading much of the current public debate
on the subject of this monograph. The two should not
be presented as rivals; in practice both are players.
The second epigraph is essential, even though it is
almost tediously familiar. It points to the heart of what
must be the argument here. Specifically, Americans
have to know themselves as foreign policy players.
More to the point, they should recognize the uniqueness

2

and content of their collective national culture. A large
fraction of public debate about U.S. foreign policy and
national security strategy in the 21st century is all but
irrelevant, because it refers to imaginary Americans.
To state the twin basics of this subject: U.S. national
security strategy, and the policy it serves, has to be a
response to the international structure of power, as
strategy is shaped, driven, or fine-tuned by U.S. national
culture. To be truly blunt, Americans are what they are
and believe what they believe. Their deepest values,
assumptions, attitudes, and even behavioral habits are
the products of the national historical experience as it
has been, and is being, interpreted and reinterpreted. A
national policy or strategy that is not sustainable when
challenged by the values of domestic culture must fail.6
For example, the United States does not “do” balance
of power politics or multipolar systems of order, at
least it has not yet. Moreover, it shows no official or
popular, as contrasted with scholarly, inclination
to shift seamlessly into such a novel and culturally
unwelcome groove.
The cultural claim registered immediately above is
not just a minor academic point. Rather, it amounts to
the statement that unless one takes generous account
of American domestic national culture, analysis of,
and recommendations for, U.S. policy and strategy
are near certain to be irrelevant. This is why so much
of the current still-burgeoning controversy over the
future of American external behavior is by and large
off the mark. The problem is not limited to the fact that
many people do not take proper account of American
ideology. In addition, even when they do note the
unhelpful or complicating factor of ideas, they choose
to discount it.7

3

To illustrate the huge scale of the problem that
underlies this enquiry, consider the fundamental
challenge to the United States in Afghanistan and
Iraq. In both cases, Americans are attempting what
may well prove to be a mission impossible. Neither
“country”—or seriously “undergoverned space,” to
coin a phrase—has given convincing evidence of being
ripe for transformation into a market democracy. The
difficulty is that Afghans, Iraqis, and Americans cannot
help being who they are, with the beliefs that they
have inherited and nursed. It is a matter of identity.
By and large, Americans are not cynical exploiters,
while Afghans and Iraqis are not generally ignorant
and cowed, though there is certainly plenty of that
to be found. Each culture, with its subcultures, is the
product of its geography and history and will change
only slowly. As a prominent British historian has
written recently: “The view that American ideology
and technology would transcend Iraqi political culture
was mistaken.”8 Iraq can be transformed only within
its own complex cultural parameters, not in defiance
of them, and then only by Iraqis.
Intrinsically, Americans have no free choice in
deciding whether or not to stand for, and frequently try
to advance, their essentially liberal notions of democracy
and of prosperity through free trade. It is not a question
of choice. As claimed already, democracy and freedom
through the benefits of a prosperous open economy are
central to the American identity. This credo and these
values can be ignored in practice on occasion, thereby
attracting well-merited charges of hypocrisy. But in its
prevailing direction, U.S. foreign policy and national
security strategy are certain to be influenced by the
culturally-driven desire to improve the world. Such is
the enduring significance of culture. However, this is
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not the whole story by any means. What happens when
U.S. policy and strategy are frustrated, as has been
the case in Afghanistan and Iraq? And how does the
United States react when it anticipates a global future
less hospitable to U.S. leadership than has obtained in
recent years? This is the fundamental dynamic context
addressed here. How hard should Americans try to
remain clearly the Number One power? The United
States requires a national security strategy and policy
sustainable in what is sure to be a future quite hostile
to American values and assumptions.
The long list of U.S. problems in Afghanistan
and Iraq should not be misinterpreted. It would be a
mistake to conclude that: (1) the United States should
cease to act hegemonically; (2) U.S. values (i.e., culture)
are flawed, for Americans and some others; (3) the U.S.
armed forces have been demonstrably incompetent.
A more sensible interpretation of events would be the
following: (1) the United States is the only candidate
for contemporary hegemon, and world order needs a
hegemon willing and able to serve as world policeman,
even one that makes some policy errors9; (2) in major
respects U.S. culture is highly attractive, which is
fortunate since it is not easily alterable, but it does need
to be advertised and applied with care and restraint
abroad; (3) Americans have become very competent at
warfighting, but that prowess has not extended across
the whole of the conflict spectrum. In common with all
great powers in the past, the United States has to learn
to cope with occasional policy failure. Failure through
human error or sheer incompetence, friction, and bad
luck should not be mistaken for precipitate decline. Too
many commentators today are proclaiming the end of
American hegemony. It is true that there are visible
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trends hostile to U.S. hegemony, the well-announced
“rise of “ China and India, and one day, just possibly,
the EU/Europe, and even a long-delayed Japan and
Brazil. But for the time being and for many years to
come, the United States will be the hegemon. This is to
say that it will be the global leader, certainly the most
important player, in any matter of grave significance
for international security. This will be what one might
call a default reality. It is, and will be, a consequence
of conscious American choice and effort. Also, U.S.
leadership, notwithstanding the exception of its
behavior towards Iraq, will rest upon a base provided
by broad global consent, albeit not always of an
enthusiastic kind.
Despite the discretion theoretically permitted by
the virtual geographical insularity of the U.S. homeland, American policy and grand strategy have been
unmistakably stable when historically viewed. Truly
great debates on America’s place and role in the outside
world, as well as on its high policy towards that world,
have been few and far between. The current ferment
of ideas and assertions is most unusual. In fact, not
since the late 1940s has there been a public debate on
U.S. foreign policy and national security policy at all
comparable to the present controversy.
As for national security strategy, for the nearest
historical precedent for the depth of contemporary
arguments one has to look back to the first Eisenhower
administration (1953-57), when the country struggled
to come to terms with nuclear realities. In both foreign
policy and military strategy, the United States settled
upon what proved to be sustainable pillars. Americans
determined to lead and be the principal material
contributor to a global anti-Communist alliance. That
ideologically and economically sustainable decision
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was undergirded by the decision to place heavy
reliance upon nuclear deterrence. Washington realized
swiftly that there was little it could do, or was prepared
to attempt, to prevent such deterrence from becoming
inconveniently mutual with respect to the Communist
bloc. The basic thrust of U.S. policy and strategy was
not to alter for 40 years, through no fewer than nine
presidencies. This is not to endorse the strategic choice
that was made, but simply to note the longevity of its
authority.
If one looks to the longue durée, one finds that there
has been a distinctive geopolitical, hence geostrategic,
pattern to U.S. national security behavior.10 Those
scholars who point to an oscillation in American
policy between expansion and withdrawal, relative
introversion and extroversion, are substantially correct.
Ideologically, which is to say culturally, Americans
desire both to remake the world into a facsimile of their
own New World, and to effect that monumental task
at distinctly limited cost.11 This cultural conflict lies at
the heart of today’s American national security debate.
From the time of America’s first emergence as a player
of world politics, which one can date generously to
the defeat of Spain in 1899, until today, the country
has intervened with massive force on the world stage
on four occasions: 1917-18; 1941-45; 1946-91; and
2001-present. In each case, the United States stepped
in violently, twice by irresistible invitation (1941 and
2001), to resolve problems of Eurasian security.
In each of the first three periods, the United
States stayed the course until the job was done,
either militarily (1918, 1945) or politically (1991).
However, September 11, 2001 (9/11) was different.
The announcement of a “long war,” a “global war on
terror” (GWOT)—both terms have now lost most of
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their official favor—has come to appear as necessary
in broad policy principle as it may be misconceived in
some contemporary practice.12 The fact that 9/11 was
directed at Americans at home compensates somewhat
for the historical reality that terrorism is in the lesser
category of threats to national security. Not many years
ago the U.S. defense community was anticipating the
possibility of the country suffering tens of millions of
casualties, at the least, should there be a breakdown in
the stability of mutual deterrence. Even an al-Qaeda
affiliate improbably armed with, and able to deploy,
one or two nuclear devices could not begin to pose a
menace comparable in scale to the erstwhile Soviet
danger. Terrorism, especially terrorism with weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), may be the “threat of the
week,” but it is easy to exaggerate its potency.
As we have seen, the national culture commands
opposing impulses: on the one hand, to democratize/
Americanize the world; on the other, to stay at home
in the comfort and now only relative security of North
America. But despite those domestic realities, Americans have been quite steady in their approach to international security. One can argue that the United States declined to accept its responsibility as a newly minted very
great power in 1919 and the subsequent two decades.
However, it is well to recall that in those years France
and Britain were still regarded widely as great powers
and, de facto, were behaving, perhaps misbehaving, on
behalf of the United States, geostrategically.13 In East
Asia the United States eventually, by 1940, did accept
the leadership of an anti-Japanese coalition. Neither
deterrence nor coercion short of force could dissuade
Japan from its pursuit of continental empire in China,
but Washington was firmly committed to resisting
such Japanese imperialism.
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When Britain and France were demoted by the
course of strategic history from the first rank of
great powers, the United States did not delay long
before it picked up the fallen flag for Western values
and geopolitical interests. But since 1946, or 1941 if
preferred, the United States has sustained resolutely
as much of an anti-hegemonic policy towards Eurasia
as it believed was needed.14 With the fall of the Soviet
imperium, however, Washington was left by default as
global hegemon, or world leader, the dominant power.
Triggered by 9/11, the United States chose to become
the hegemon with a predominant purpose, to conduct
a GWOT. Whether the “long war” against terrorists is
sustainable as the centerpiece of U.S. national security
strategy, there are grounds to doubt. The principal
reason for skepticism is not so much uncertainty over
the persistence of violent Islamism. Rather, doubts
accrue as to the prospect of a recognizable victory.
Furthermore, other global developments are likely
to reduce the relative significance of the terrorist
menace.
When considered over the longer term, as in this
monograph, U.S. foreign policy, national security
policy, and strategy must reconcile the demands
of a domestic culture that can have dysfunctional
consequences abroad, with the objective circumstances
of the outside world. It is almost entirely useless for
American or other scholars to write books and articles
urging a U.S. policy that affronts American culture.
The beginning of wisdom has to be with Sun-tzu’s
dictum on the necessity for knowledge of the enemy
and of oneself. To be sustainable, American policy and
strategy must be broadly compatible with American
values. Perhaps not all American values, and not all
of the time. But any policy vision that is plainly un-
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American is certain to fail at home eventually. Foreign
policy is born at home and has to succeed there if it is
to succeed abroad.
The current debate to which this monograph relates
is replete with arguments about anticipated features of
the 21st century that will prove desperately challenging
to American national culture. It may well be that this
century will see a return of multipolar balance-ofpower politics on a global scale. But when one considers this possibility, even probability, one needs to remember that American culture wants to reject what it
regards as the cynical balance-of-power politics of expediency. Americans believe it is a mission of their unique
country to improve the world. If thwarted in this noble,
even (in the opinion of many) divine, mission, they are
likely to insist that the country withdraw, adopting a
minimalist foreign policy. Controversialist Christopher
Layne speaks for many Americans when he writes:
“Precisely because of its power and geography, there
is very little the United States needs to do in the world
in order to be secure.”15 This is not a majority opinion
at present, but it does express a powerful enduring
current in American culture.
Any and all discussion of a sustainable U.S. national
security strategy must be at least as attentive to the
persisting realities of American culture as it is to the
constraints and opportunities of the outside world. In
addition, many scholars and even some official planners are apt to neglect the potent roles that can be
played by eccentric personal preference, incompetence,
error, pure accident, and unavoidable bad luck. The
realm of national security strategy is far from friction
free.16
The body of this work opens with an explanation
of the structure of the subject of national security

10

strategy; it then attempts to peer into the future to
identify assumptions that should be robust, albeit
with caveats attached. Next, the discussion specifies
the most desirable American role in the world of the
21st century. From the American role, the analysis
moves on to consider the most appropriate strategy.
The monograph closes with observations and recommendations on national security strategy.
The Strategic Challenge.
Because of the inherent complexity of our subject, it
is most important to appreciate both the whole structure
that is relevant and its parts, as well as how the structure
of strategy should function. National security strategy
can make no sense if approached in isolation.17 It is not
self-referential. It must express and serve a national
security policy. In addition, it has to be implemented
by agencies, military and civilian, whose capabilities
roughly match the authoritative goals. The strategic
challenge in the title of this section is the difficulty
of keeping ways, means, and ends approximately in
balance so that they are mutually supportive.18 This
task is extraordinarily difficult to accomplish. The
principal source of difficulty may repose with policy
goals that overreach or underreach; with purposeful
strategy that does not advance policy, or even the
complete absence of such strategy; or with military and
other means that are excessive or inadequate. Michael
Howard offers the counterintuitive judgment that “the
strategy adopted is always more likely to be dictated
rather by the availability of means than by the nature
of the ends.”19 Although this view has major merit, it
can mislead. While it is true to claim that as a general
rule a government “makes war, not as one would like
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to, but as one must,”20 it is also the case that the United
States often has suffered from a strategy deficit.21
The whole structure of our subject has the following
components:
1. Culture (e.g., values, vision)
2. U.S. role in the world
3. State of the world, international environment
4. National security policy
5. National security strategy
6. Military strategy
7. Military forces.
American national culture is always liable to
contribute significantly to external policy. Culture
expresses the nation’s dominant values and its vision
of how the world ought to be and how the country
should relate to that world. Just as it would be absurd to
interpret American history without regard to the ideas
and beliefs that have shaped, even ruled, American
minds, so it would be unsound to treat the future
of American national security policy and strategy
without accounting for the potential influence of
culture. Americans do not and will not behave abroad
strictly as rational actors coldly assessing their national
interest in material terms. The United States assuredly
will seek to overbalance possibly menacing physical
power. But Washington will assess, calculate, and
behave for purposes and in terms that are ideational
as well as material-structural. For example, the United
States will strive not merely to keep the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) materially subordinate with
reference to the power balance. In addition, it will
strive to “improve” China as well as America’s global
trading partners and dependents. Beyond the national
culture expressed in the ideals of liberty, freedom,
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democracy, and open markets, American culture has
strategic and military-institutional branches. There is
an “American way of war” that reflects the national
geography, history, and ideology.22 However, culture,
though important, does not alone determine policy
and strategy. Objective material realities are an ever
possible source of constraint on national preference,
as are the surprise effects of unexpected happenings.
Culture is important, but it is not all-important.
America’s role in the world is much more the product
of cultural choice than is usual for most countries.23 One
can plead strategic necessity for many of the country’s
wars: for a supposedly peace-loving democracy, there
have been many such.24 But on close inspection, the
national geography truly donated a large measure of
policy discretion to America’s statesmen. Americans
now are more than comfortable with the idea that
the United States is Number One. The implications
of unipolarity after 1991 (or 1989, with the collapse
of the Soviet imperium) are not always plain, but the
American public has accustomed itself to the idea
of primacy, even hegemony in the sense of global
leadership.
To be the global hegemon is a role that only the
United States can play, whether it performs well or
poorly. However, the country is not an ideologically
disinterested, effectively neutral, guardian of world
order. This sheriff aspires to extend the domain of its
interpretation of good law, not merely to enforce it in
areas already civilized.25 Very occasionally, Americans
debate the ways and means to implement their role in
the world, but the ends are constant and nonnegotiable.
Historically speaking, there have been few exceptions
among American statesmen to those who have signed
on in the Golden Book for freedom and democracy.
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One can always find a stand-out, a true pragmatist
untroubled by the manifest desirability of operating
a value-free foreign policy. Richard M. Nixon and his
eminence grise, Henry Kissinger, spring to mind.26
Nonetheless, one would find it difficult to people a
dinner party of modest size with American leaders
from all periods who were wholehearted practitioners
of that game of nations, Realpolitik. America’s role in
the world should, not must, accommodate irresistible
external pressures and elements, but it will do so in an
American way. This way is not a single-lane highway.
Nonetheless, no matter how particular American
leaders play their hand in global politics, their style
will reflect the national culture which they share.
American culture has to function, even bow to,
the external context. The dynamic state of the world,
the international environment as scholars have come
to call it, is a complex objective reality that Americans
can do little to alter. This is not to deny that the United
States is by far the most influential player of global
politics. Furthermore, it is not to forget that the country
periodically is inclined to exaggerate its potential
to reshape that reality to its own preferred image.
The recent, and just about still current, U.S. (actually
Anglo-American) crusade for democracy is a classic
expression of this American tendency to overreach.
Whether or not there is a valid connection between the
democratization of formerly politically pagan lands
and progress in the GWOT is really moot. The world
cannot be democratized by American power and influence and neither can it be converted by American domestic example. As a general rule, a stable democracy
has to be almost wholly a domestic growth. Appreciation
of that aspect of the contemporary state of the world is
not much in dispute among scholars.
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The world political system is still unipolar, and it
should remain so for some years to come.27 Nonetheless,
there is widespread agreement that the United States
is in relative decline, as other, currently regional,
powers, increase their individual strength vis-à-vis
the U.S. hegemon. Since 2003 in particular, which
saw the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq on March
17, some regional great powers, actual and aspiring,
have made a habit of collaborating to try to clip the
American eagle’s wings.28 This political development
was inevitable. The only questions were, and remain,
how soon would a coalition, probably only a loose
one at first, emerge to challenge U.S. hegemonism,
how effective would it prove to be, and how would
the United States react? These are the questions that
underlie contemporary domestic America and foreign
debate. Many scholars and journalists are fond of
identifying the course of current events as the turning
of a historical corner. The metaphor is popular and
benefits from an absence of temporal perspective. At
present, one can suggest the global political system is
still unipolar, broadly if unevenly policed by American
culture, and, if needs be, by American threats or the
actual use of military force. But America’s “unipolar
moment” allegedly is either passing or already has
receded into history. It was foreshortened by the
muscular errors that produced imperial overstretch
in Afghanistan and Iraq, so the narrative runs.29 In
place of American hegemony—a complex reality that
requires closer attention than it is usually granted,
as the ever perceptive Jeremy Black reminds us30—a
new era of multipolarity allegedly is dawning. This
may be a sound prediction. Indeed, in the long run it
is all but certain to be correct. But it is by no means
self-evident that America’s “moment” of unshared,
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unbalanced, strategic preponderance must vanish any
time soon. There is widespread agreement, therefore,
among the U.S. commentariat that multipolarity is the
future. However, whether that future is near-term one
ought to doubt. Furthermore, few of the prophets of
multipolarity appear to understand the problems with
the condition they espouse.
The state of the world, the context wherein the
United States must locate and exercise its role, is
flush with troubles, actual and for once fairly reliably
predictable. A sustainable U.S. national security
strategy will need to be effective in coping with the
following leading threats to American and global wellbeing, presented here in descending order of probable
significance:
1. Return of great power conflict (i.e., multipolarity).
2. Climate change: resource shortages—water, food,
energy.
3. Overpopulation, illegal mass migration, policy
pressures in overpopulated countries, pandemics.
4. Globalization: economic, cultural, political,
military—very uneven development and prosperity.
5. Nuclear proliferation and regional nuclear wars.
6. “Islamist” terrorism.
These are not alternatives. They will occur in
bunches, simultaneously and interdependently in some
cases. Obviously, climate change, overpopulation,
and uneven development comprise a witch’s brew
of menaces to international order. Scholars will differ
over an item or two among the six offered, certainly
in their suggested prioritization. But overall, these six
sources of trouble are postulated with high confidence.
It will be in the context provided by these dynamic
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difficulties that Americans will seek to be strategically
effective in a sustainable way.
Next, it is mandatory that a clear distinction be
maintained between national security policy and national
security strategy. At some risk of banality, this analysis
insists upon crystal clarity in their relationship, even
though there needs to be a continuous discourse
between them. Civilian policymakers should
influence generals and vice versa. But that dialogue,
appropriately termed unequal by Eliot Cohen because
of the necessity for civilian control, should not transform
politicians functionally into generals nor generals into
politicians.31 A national security strategy must be a joint
civil-military product. It should be created, exercised,
and, when essential, revised, with vital inputs from
both civilians and soldiers.32 Nonetheless, national
security strategy can always only be instrumental. If
one seeks to understand what the strategy is supposed
to achieve, one must lift one’s gaze and examine policy.
This is where political intentions have to be specified.
In practice, culture or material temptation sometimes
drives policy and strategy without the two engaging in
honest and realistic dialogue. Policy may specify goals
that are chosen for desirability, with scant attention
paid to feasibility. For example, U.S. policy has sought
to democratize Iraq and trigger a benign democratic
revolution throughout the realm of Islam. It is a serious
mistake to confuse national security policy, let alone
national security strategy, with foreign policy. National
security, or grand, strategy, refers in all definitions to
the potential or actual orchestration of any and every
national asset for purposes selected by national security
policy. But those purposes need to entail some risk of
war.33 Grand strategy can be pursued in time of peace as
well as war, but it is important to use the concept only
when the military dimension is prominent and the use
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of force is a distinct possibility, if not probability. In the
same way that strategic studies must not be subsumed
into an overly broad, all-dangers, security studies, so
national security strategy has to retain a strong military
flavor, despite its breadth of domain.34
Under the umbrella of national security strategy lies
military strategy. Confusion of the two is commonplace.
Although war most essentially entails fighting, as Carl
von Clausewitz insists, not every exercise of national
security strategy requires warfare.35 Adroit diplomacy
or cunningly applied economic coercion may remove
need for the spilling of blood. However, since national
security strategy has the military element at its core,
it must follow that military strategy is nearly always
critical to the success of policy. If the United States
chooses and conducts military strategy incompetently
to the point of battlefield defeat on a theater-wide scale, it
is unlikely to be possible to find adequate compensation
through the skillful employment of other agencies of
national power and influence. Once committed to a
conflict, military force has a way of mattering more
than anything else. Even though fighting is not always
potentially the most effective source of strategic effect,
if one loses in combat the fighting will assume the pole
position in relative significance.
Most typically, the regular side in irregular
warfare cannot win the war as a whole militarily, but
paradoxically, even ironically, it can be defeated by
failure in combat. In 1964, Bernard B. Fall expressed
the condition thus:
[G]uerrilla warfare is nothing but a tactical appendage
of a far vaster political contest and . . . no matter how
expertly it is fought by competent and dedicated
professionals, it cannot possibly make up for the absence
of a political rationale.36
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In both Iraq and Afghanistan today, growing U.S.
competence in counterinsurgency (COIN) and
counterterror (CT) has not until recently been married
to a political rationale sufficiently favored by local
power brokers. As a result, it is uncertain as to whether
U.S. COIN efforts will produce the lasting political
effects sought by Washington.
In 1954, the defeat of the 17 elite battalions (only 10
fought any one time) of the French Colonial Army at
Dien Bien Phu had conclusive political consequences,
albeit not ones that fully satisfied the Vietnamese.37
Ho Chi Minh was bullied by China and Russia into
tolerating the temporary creation of a South Vietnam.
For the exception to the rule that defeat in battle is fatal,
it is historically accurate to note that although French
colonial forces won the fighting in Algeria, France lost
the war.38 For further illustration, it can be persuasively
argued that the United States defeated the Viet Cong
and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) in resisting
the Tet Offensive in 1968, as well as in subsequent
operations, yet still lost the war.
This monograph recognizes the sovereignty of
politics over warfare and endorses the view that there
are some conflicts that cannot be concluded successfully
by military means. But we also wish to contradict the
all too prevalent notion that actual fighting is only of
secondary importance. The view taken here is that the
primacy of politics, indeed of culture, does not mean
that tactical military outcomes are of little significance.
To stumble into that opinion is to overreach with
the sound argument that military success does not
necessarily translate into victory in a war overall.39
The final piece of the puzzle tackled here is the armed
forces: soldiers, their morale, institutions, doctrines,
training, tactical skills, equipment, and combat
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effectiveness or fighting power. Military strategy
should change only at a pace consistent with actual
military prowess. If the armed forces cannot perform
adequately at their core or defining activity of fighting,
then military strategy, national security strategy, and
policy will be frustrated. The soldiers of the Third Reich
could not defeat the soldiers of Soviet Russia. German
military strategy faltered and collapsed in the face of
too much distance, too large an enemy, and repeated
logistical disasters and other systemic weaknesses.40
In Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s, the U.S. armed
forces, though markedly improving, demonstrated
and publicly acknowledged a lack of expertise in the
early conduct of warfare against irregular enemies.41
Irregular conflict, as in Iraq today, the U.S. Army’s
preferred type of war. This Army, at least until recently,
has not been properly indoctrinated, equipped, and
trained to succeed in Iraq. As much to the point, one
must add, the soldiers have served generally faulty
military strategy, and poor national security strategy,
in ultimate pursuit of impractical policy goals. Strategy,
operations, and tactics in Iraq all improved in 2007,
culminated by claims of imminent military victory in
late 2008, but it may well be the case that Iraqi internal
political divisions will yet scuttle U.S. efforts.
Every layer in the national security architecture has
to function effectively enough. Not perfectly; one must
not seek an impossibly immaculate performance. No
matter which desirable policy goals are chosen, and
regardless of the theoretical wisdom in the selected
strategy, to repeat, if the military machine cannot
deliver sufficient success the entire project will fail.
Culture, policy, strategy, operations, tactics, and
logistics depend upon each other. The monumental
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task of combining policy intent with the necessary ways
and means is the domain of strategy, both national
security or grand, and military.
Global Security and Future Warfare.
Clausewitz provides somber meditations on uncertainty, risk, chance, and friction as prominent
features of warfare.42 Of course, he is correct. But the
great Prussian philosopher does bound his warnings,
explicitly and implicitly. Notwithstanding his vigorous
claim that “war is the realm of uncertainty” and his
striking simile claiming that “[i]n the whole range of
human activities, war most closely resembles a game
of cards,” his is not the counsel of despair in the face of
a blind chance.43 If we read On War carefully and reflect
on the meaning of the whole book, it becomes obvious
that the author judges governments and their military
commanders to be far from helpless when chance
strikes a potentially cruel blow.44 First, Clausewitz
praises a process of detailed war planning, hardly an
activity that could be very valuable should chance reign
supreme.45 Second, he recognizes the role of genius in
command as offering some protection against cruel
strokes of fate.46 Genius appears on a sliding scale of
merit and requires a competent military instrument for
its realization in action. Often it is said that operational
planning is of more utility for the training of planners
than for the plans that it yields.
Uncertainty is a feature of war, rendering warfare
exceptionally difficult to treat analytically. Uncertainty
can have a positive effect, as typically was claimed for
nuclear deterrence.47 But more generally it is a blight
that cannot be treated conclusively. Because the future
has not happened, defense planning cannot help
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becoming guesswork.48 This guesswork generally is
performed carefully, though one should never forget
that the country’s military posture ultimately is not
the product strictly of a rational process of strategic
net assessment. In addition, perhaps preponderantly,
the posture is the result of an essentially political
process keyed to questions of money. Of recent years,
the U.S. defense community has taken the principle of
uncertainty very much to heart. In fact, there is some
danger that a prudent recognition of uncertainty may
be accorded undue authority. As some scholars have
begun to notice, although war is beset by nonlinearity,
uncertainty, chance, and even chaotic conditions, by
no means is it impervious to purposeful direction.49
If it were, there could be no place for strategy. In
historical practice, uncertainty, chance, and risk
assuredly attend war and warfare, but they are simply
conditions under which strategically educated leaders
must labor. Clausewitz should not be characterized as
a chaos theorist; he was not one such. To indicate how
uncertain is the future, especially war in the future, is
not to claim that the course of events is beyond shaping
and even control.50
Empirical historical studies of defense planning,
usually called war planning, are fairly rare. Single
country works and treatises that are almost cookbooks
on how to do it correctly, are far more common. It so
happens that an edited book of unusual relevance to
our concerns here has appeared recently. The previous
major study a generation ago focused only on World
War I: War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914, edited
by Paul M. Kennedy.51 In contrast, the recent volume,
The Fog of Peace and War Planning: Military and Strategic
Planning Under Uncertainty, edited by Talbot C. Imlay
and Marcia Duffy Toft, covers the great powers from
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1815 to 1961.52 Although the conclusions offered by the
editors are less than startling, their brief introductory
rumination is useful. For example, they offer the
following nugget which combines the blindingly
obvious with shrewd judgment:
But if the task of military planning is indispensable,
it is also fraught with an uncertainty rooted in three
basic problems: that of identifying friend and foe, that
of understanding the nature of future war, and that of
determining its timing.
Timing probably involves the greatest uncertainty. Aside
from cases of deliberate aggression planners cannot
confidently know whether war will break out tomorrow,
next week, next year, or in the next decade.53

The implication of Imlay and Toft’s statement is
that war planning in peacetime cannot be performed
efficiently.54 The problem of deciding upon adequate
defense preparation is the familiar one of insurance.
How much protection should be purchased as a prudent hedge against threats that may never materialize?
In this monograph, unless otherwise specified,
defense planning refers to what used to be, and in
some quarters still is, known as war planning. This
is planning for the country’s overall defense posture,
as well as military planning for operations at the high
end of the operational spectrum. The text recognizes
that the United States conducts planning at every
level: from the political-policy, through the grandstrategic, to the military strategic, the theater—and
lower, to the operational and tactical. In point of fact,
the staffs in the vast multilayered bureaucracy of the
U.S. Government, especially in its military institutions,
write and rewrite plans of different kinds all the time.
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Given that the mission here is to identify a sustainable
national security strategy, the discussion of plans and
planning generally refers to processes of discussion,
decision, and action at that level.
It is well to develop and retain empathy for
defense planners, because theirs is a necessary though
awesomely challenging task. Because one is unavoidably ignorant about the future, that does not mean that
the vital subjects of this section—global security and
future warfare—can be neglected. Since one can only
guess about the future of warfare, guess one must.55 To
cut to the chase, when one seeks a sustainable national
security strategy, a hugely immodest project, what
guidance can one seek, and from which sources? Must
the future resemble the past? Unfortunately, history is
all that is available for guidance. Yet “history” is not an
objective record of who did what to whom, when, and
why. Rather it is a confusion of competing historians
who have told what they believed occurred. “The
lessons of history” are notoriously short of authority.
Nonetheless, since the defense planners of today
have to beware lest they project the current context
mindlessly into the future, and can know nothing
definite about the future, rival interpretations of the
past are the only source of inspiration extant. Of course,
one could sever the anchor chain to history and elect
to go boldly into almost a wholly unfamiliar security
future. It is possible, some would say desirable, to plan
for a 21st century which bears little resemblance to
the 20th and 19th. Attractive visions of global security
radically different from current conditions are not hard
to invent, but the appeal does not survive close study,
at least it has yet to do so.56
American defense planners are required to think and
prepare for a global domain. Even should a future U.S.
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administration express an inward-looking domestic
mood and attempt a significant reversal of today’s
forward presence, it would soon discover that its
security concerns were distressingly global. The United
States is too important an actor in all dimensions of
world affairs, not least the financial and economic (e.g.,
maritime trade), to be able to pull up the drawbridge
and mind its own business, inoffensively, in North
America. This is not to claim that Americans have
no choice in their national security policy, and hence
strategy. But it does mean that because the country
is the most essential of players in a global system of
international relations, it must protect its vital national
interests by accepting at least some measure of foreign
engagement. How much, of what kind, and to what
ends, are the issues here. Also, it is necessary never to
forget the literally vital logistical dimension of national
security strategy. Forward military deployment and
basing are key enablers of strategic effectiveness.57
It is with some discomfort that I mix description
with prediction and prescription. Indeed, I am
generally altogether averse to prediction. However,
at this juncture it is necessary to specify the working
assumptions that should provide the bedrock, the firm
footings, for the architecture of a sustainable American
national security strategy. Although these are chosen
strictly personally, they are widely shared, even if some
readers find a few of them controversial. What should
U.S. policymakers and military leaders assume about
the future of global security and warfare? What do
they believe they know about the future? Even if they
are not at all certain, what do they choose to assume as
a matter of prudence concerning distant hypothetical,
threats. Here are six fundamental assumptions:
1. War is endemic in the human condition. Officials
should not be distracted, let alone convinced, by
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scholars who write about the transformation of war,
about “new wars,” about the end of war, or the end of
major war as we have known it.58 War, and its signature
activity, warfare, quintessentially involving fighting
and killing, are here to stay. Aside from the years of
world war, the period since the end of the Cold War
has been as bloody as any, and bloodier than most, in
the 20th century. Those theorists, officials, and soldiers,
who believed after 1991 that the future of conflict
would be so constrained that Western forces would be
limited to performing peacekeeping duties, Operations
Other Than War (OOTW), and occasional brief fly-by
bombardments, were seriously in error. Given the
contemporary enthusiasm for military modernization
around the world, except for EU-Europe, there is no
doubt that this first assumption is near universally
shared.
2. Warfare will both evolve and appear in several
forms. Because of its superior investment in military
technology, the United States is right to assume that it
will lead the process of military innovation.59 However,
it is also correct in the relatively new assumption
that advanced technology, though generally apt to
be useful, cannot guarantee even tactical success, let
alone operational, strategic or political.60 Defense
planners have to consider evolution in the “grammar”
of war, as Clausewitz calls the mechanics of warfare,
holistically.61 The U.S. military establishment must
recall old practices that were effective, as well as
innovate, if it is to shine in future conflicts. The future is
near certain to call on Americans to wage both regular
and irregular warfare, often in the same trial of arms.
In some cases, the United States will be able to choose
the wars it fights in the 21st century; they will be wars
of discretion. However, it would be an over-bold
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prediction to claim that all of America’s wars will be of
that sort. Similarly, it would be rash indeed to predict
that the character of America’s future warfare will be
dictated in the large by Americans. Adaptability has
always been essential; it will remain so.
To record a worrying thought, Americans are so
habituated to the blessings of technological superiority
that they do not often consider the perils of nonlinear
technical developments abroad that could place
them behind the curve of innovation and its military
exploitation. What if the next revolution in military
affairs (RMA) leverages radically new technologies,
and the leveraging is achieved preeminently by
Chinese, Indians, or Europeans?62 One brave but
thoughtful prophet, Dale Walton, envisages with
confidence the emergence of a new “technological
‘super-revolution’.” According to Walton, this “superrevolution,” comprising “interrelated revolutions in
biotechnology, nanotechnology, robotics, computer
science, and other areas will result in extraordinarily
potent war-fighting innovations.”63 Walton goes so
far as to predict that “given the pace of technological
change, it should be expected that within two decades
a new RMA, the successor to the increasingly mature
Second American RMA [nuclear and information
technology], will be in evidence.”64
One needs to consider as well the fact that we
are still only at the beginning of the military space
age, while cyber warfare, though already rife, is
thoroughly immature. America may out-resource its
actual and potential enemies by a country mile, but is
it possible that those foes might invest more cunningly
and effectively, especially in the uses to which new
technology can be put? So many and unfamiliar are
the military-technological possibilities of this century,
that major outbreaks of warfare may be asymmetrical
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and historically nonlinear to the point of offering
war-winning advantages to the more imaginative
and innovative belligerent. This is not a prediction,
but anyone obliged to think about future warfare
would be foolish were he simply to assume that the
United States will be wise and lucky in its technical,
and consequential doctrinal, operational, and tactical
choices.
3. Global order is a meaningful concept: such order has
to be policed by someone or something. Global order is a
value-charged idea, as is the claim that it needs to be
kept. In practice, there may be extant no global condition
that one could term orderly and no state, coalition, or
international institution seeking to maintain order. By
order, we understand a stable global context wherein
the principal actors behave predictably in a manner
that does not challenge the legitimacy or regular
functioning of the prevailing pattern of international
relations.65 The United States has decided that terrorism, most especially Islamic fundamentalist terrorism,
now commonly referred to as violent Islamism, is
a threat to global order. More to the point, perhaps,
since 1991, albeit not without a wobble or two, the
United States has sought to play the thankless but selfflattering role of global guardian. Literally in every
place in the world today that is experiencing serious
instability, the United States is a relevant presence
serving the American notion of order, arguably with
the lonely exception of sub-Saharan Africa. While the
United States is nominally committed to the concept of
global order for its own sake, it has been most actively
committed, as noted already, to advancing a desirable
order through the promotion of democracy and open
markets.
American national culture and world events have
produced a situation wherein the United States is
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“globocop.” Americans are combating the illegal drug
industry in South and Central America (as well as
in Afghanistan); through the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), they are on the line should the
Russian Federation overreach in its harassment of the
revived Baltic states, and one day possibly, Ukraine
and Georgia; it is in the forefront of efforts to suppress
violent Islamism in the Middle East, South Asia, and
East Asia; and it is literally on the firing line in South
Korea as well as prospectively in the Taiwan Straits. All
of these and other dangerous tasks can be rationalized,
and indeed may be judged sound, strategically, but,
like the British Empire, they have been acquired
piecemeal. Although the judgment bears hard on
Americans, despite the pleasure of a sense of primacy,
the global political system needs the United States as
a policing agent. The system needs to be disciplined
by some factor additional to the universal operation of
enlightened self-interest and of good behavior norms
as well as some “laws.”
States or other communities need to be disciplined
when they misbehave according to the standards that
typically prevail, and indeed that need to prevail if
the existing international order is to remain tolerably
stable. In cases of minor transgressions, or of aggressive
behavior by minor players, either international
institutions or relatively strong regional powers may
suffice to restore the status quo ante or compel a
satisfactory compromise. But when the menace is on
a scale, or has a geographical reach, that is more than
local or minor, the United States at present is the only
candidate for the role of global policeman on behalf,
naturally, of its own notion of order.
The role is expensive and often unrewarding
at best, and is certain periodically to be unpopular
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domestically. However, if the United States should
decline to establish a forward presence around the
world, off-shore or on-shore Eurasia, either materially
or credibly in potential, then it would cease to be a
shaping, let alone the most significant, factor in the
future of international relations.
After Iraq, Americans could well decide that the
possibilities of policy and strategic error are so large
that the country should not trust itself to play the global
guardian role. But one can predict that such a public
policy mood would not long endure. The consequences
of America-light purposeful behavior globally would
come to be too uncomfortable for most Americans.
Admittedly, this is a bold, perhaps rash, prediction.
But it expresses the view that were the United States
to disengage seriously from actual and potential
security duties around Eurasia, it would soon regret
the decision. This is not to neglect the possibility that
elements of such a process of American disengagement
from Eurasia, on-shore if not off-shore, might be
compelled by the political decisions and strategic
advances of others. Policy and strategy decisions may
not be wholly discretionary for Washington.
4. War entails warfare, and warfare always is about
fighting. Warfare is not only about fighting, but
combat is the signature behavior of armies. Moreover,
as Clausewitz, the master thinker, insists in muchquoted words: “The decision by arms is for all major
and minor operations in war what cash payment is in
commerce.”66 The U.S. armed forces currently are in
no danger of neglecting their mandatory generic core
competency—fighting. Leaders of all armed forces,
everywhere, at least pay lip service to the connection
between their profession and warfare, but many of
them have no serious expectation of ever having to fire
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shots in anger. Moreover, of those military institutions
that do have grounds to anticipate action, the force in
question is far more likely to be applied on behalf of
domestic order than in the conduct of interstate war.
Although American soldiers today are no strangers
to warfare, it is a long time since they faced a firstclass regular enemy, even a distinctly asymmetrical
one.67 It should be noted that all warfare is in some
measure asymmetrical. The word is easily abused by
overemployment. Not since 1953 in Korea have enemy
aircraft occasionally been a nuisance to U.S. ground
forces, while a context wherein the enemy held air
superiority has not been suffered since 1943 in Sicily.
America’s foes in the GWOT or among the ranks of
roguish states are sometimes cunning, reasonably welltrained, experienced, and exceedingly determined, all
of which count for a lot. But they lack the resources
to wage warfare on a major scale. Acquisition of
WMD should greatly reduce the political and strategic
disadvantages of such belligerents in the future, but
this is still largely a future prospect. Of course, North
Korea already has its nuclear equalizer, and Iran is well
on the way to acquiring one also.
It has been a long time since the warriors of the
United States have had to fight an enemy of approximately the same military weight, even if that enemy
were to fight in a style that was highly asymmetrical. In
World War II by 1943-45, the Wehrmacht needed to seek
compensation for U.S., British, and Russian material
superiority in its tactical skill, sheer determination,
well-chosen terrain to defend, and some equipment
quality edge. Of necessity, it waged a poor man’s style
of regular warfare. American soldiers, making the
prudent assumption that there will be “regular” fighting
in their future, should not assume that materially well-
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endowed regular foes will fight in ways symmetrical
to U.S. preferences and expectations.68
Assumptions are cultural, or nearly such, and do
not alter readily, even in the face of evidence suggesting
they are ill-founded.69 As many commentators have
noticed, it has long been assumed by the U.S. armed
forces that real warfare was regular in character.
Today there is some danger that that assumption has
been dropped in favor of an expectation of COIN
and CT. As a corrective to the previous assumption,
some swing in the direction of the irregular end of the
combat spectrum is welcome. However, it is unsafe
to assume that America’s strategic history will be
principally concerned with warfare against enemies
who must fight irregularly. On the one hand, there is
a full house of potentially hostile states emerging in
world politics. On the other hand, it is neither desirable
nor politically feasible for the U.S. armed forces to be
committed principally to the conduct of major COIN
and CT campaigns.
By all means American soldiers should seek to
improve their understanding of the cultural dimension
of warfare. But one cannot expect and should not seek
a transformation in the American way of war in favor
of general prowess in irregular warfare. The U.S.
armed forces are sufficiently large to be able to afford
specialized capability for COIN and CT. Military
force, U.S. style, is strong on maneuver, certainly on
movement, and firepower. This style is not tailor-made
for the conduct of counterirregular warfare, although
it has its place, as does technological sophistication
despite its limitations. Most of the U.S. armed forces
are designed to meet and defeat other regular forces.
They should remain tilted thus in their competencies.
Certainly they can acquire and hone skills at COIN and
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CT, and they should increase their cultural awareness,
as indeed is occurring today. First and foremost,
though, they need to remain an adaptable instrument
for combat against states.
5. New first-class competitors/enemies will emerge
(indeed, are emerging already). Some Americans have
been so smitten with the ideology of primacy, despite
the experience in Iraq since 2003, that they cannot
quite sign on to the assumption that a worthy “super”
enemy or coalition of enemies will emerge over the next
several decades. But such an emergence is precisely
the prediction on the part of the author, and it is a
current assumption of many, though by no means all,
of America’s strategic theorists and commentators.
Understandably and probably wisely, the government
is publicly uncommitted on the subject of the duration
of the American hegemony. Obviously, American
officials do not wish to predict their country’s decline
and fall from ascendancy.
Regional great powers such as China, India, Russia,
possibly EU-Europe, Brazil, and Iran, among others,
must balance the value of a faraway U.S. hegemon
with a distant homeland, against the political insult
and damage to local ambitions and interests that
such a hegemon inflicts. Americans can assume with
confidence that their current global role as guardian of
order increasingly will be opposed by rising states and
coalitions, most especially in East Asia. However, it is
necessary to remember that this region, the emerging
center of world politics and the most dynamic source
of economic globalization, has its own rivalries and
may be able to provide a regional balance of power
even without active U.S. participation. Because of
a long-time focus on Europe and the Middle East,
many American analysts are wont to forget the unique
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geography, geopolitics, and geostrategic conditions
of East and South Asia. The distances are immense,
with the regions and subregions divided by extensive
forbidding terrain—desert, mountains, jungle—and
with the commercial and military contexts being
largely geographically maritime. East Asia is about as
different from Europe as it can be, geographically and
politically.70 Moreover, as Dale Walton perceptively
observes, East Asia is not a potential power vacuum,
even should the United States greatly reduce its
forward presence.71 China, India, and Japan (not to
mention Russia and Indonesia) are likely to prove
more than capable of balancing each other. Indeed, if
one is worried about a credibly potential 1914 scenario
in the 21st century, indigenous East Asian balance of
power politics is probably the subject to examine.72
6. Surprise happens. Finally, since uncertainty now is
accorded its official due if not more than it merits, it is
reasonable to claim that U.S. defense planners recognize
the certainty of future major surprises, favorable
and otherwise.73 The future of warfare will record
extensive activity all along the spectrum of regularityirregularity; no surprise there. But, it is also very
likely to contain some RMAs. Given the contemporary
immaturity of biotechnology, space technology, and
cyber technology, it is not exactly a bold leap into the
unknown to predict further technology-led RMAs.
Actually, it is unconvincing to predict that warfare
of most kinds will not be reshaped by biotechnology,
nanotechnology, robotics, and information technology
(IT), just to cite the more obvious technical baskets.74
Given that the U.S. defense community, along with the
Chinese, Russian, Indian, and many others, currently is
still low on the learning curve for the confident conduct
of cyber warfare, just one area of certain technical
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progress, the perils of specific prediction become all
too obvious. The United States has to assume that
technology, culture (including political beliefs), and
diplomatic ties, as well as the consequences of climate
change, hold some nonlinearities that will threaten to
make the expectations of so-called long-term planners
appear distinctly foolish. So it was in the 19th and
20th centuries. There is thus every reason to believe
that the 21st will significantly discomfort U.S. defense
planners.75
The American Role.
What should be the American role in a future
world that could well be as dangerous, if not more so,
than that described and analyzed above? To behave in
such a manner that the U.S. national interest, singular
and plural, is best protected and advanced, of course.
But how should that be done?—that is the question.
Perhaps the first epigraph of this monograph provides
the vital clue: “If American hegemony is the answer,
what is the question?” The Bush administration of 200203 vintage was in no doubt that active U.S. leadership
in the world was essential. Such forthright behavior,
expressing a global moral and material primacy—
hegemony was not a favored term—was required in
order to ensure America’s safety. The vicious assaults of
9/11 and the previous outrages in New York City and
in Africa in the 1990s were undoubtedly a challenge to
the United States. But did they amount to a dare to the
country to wage a GWOT? Was it not more likely that
a global American response which favored military
intervention, forcible regime change, and other actions
of a violent character, was almost exactly the reaction
that fanatical Islamists sought to trigger? After all, their
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real target is the House of Islam, not the purportedly
decadent societies of West (and East). Be that as it may,
the United States chose to pick up the gauntlet and
join global battle with al-Qaeda, its associates, and its
imitators.
As the more perceptive of American commentators
have noted, U.S. national security policy in the 2000s,
though not necessarily its strategy, is heavily influenced
by the national culture. Some of the persisting features
of American culture produce the appearance and reality
of history repeating itself. As this monograph seeks to
divine the future of U.S. national security strategy and
seeks in particular to discover the necessary elements
for sustainability, the cultural contribution looms ever
larger.
Compare the following statements, one by a
president who has become iconic and in life was a
conservative Democrat, the other by a president who
at present is less than iconic in a positive sense and
is a muscular liberal Republican (on foreign policy).
In his Inaugural Address on January 21, 1961, John
F. Kennedy made the following solemn pledge:
“We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any
hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to
assure the survival and the success of liberty.”76 This
was not hollow rhetoric. It reflected American values
and self-confidence. Vietnam was not the inevitable
consequence of the pledge, and others in similar vein,
but the many decisions that led to America’s decadelong war in South East Asia were enabled by the global
role thus identified. To fast-forward to June 1, 2002,
one finds President George W. Bush declaring thus:
“We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and
tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good
relations among the great powers. We will extend the
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peace by encouraging free and open societies on every
continent.”77
In that same seminal document, The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America (September
2002), President Bush could hardly have been clearer
in his mixture of hard-headed realism and crusading
liberalism. “The U.S. national security strategy will
be based on a distinctly American internationalism
that reflects the union of our values and our national
interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world
not just safer but better.”78
And how is this to be accomplished? The answer
is by the global promotion of the Big Three Values—
“freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.” Based on
the Big Three just quoted, President Bush declared,
“The great struggles of the 20th century between liberty
and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory
for the forces of freedom—and a single sustainable
model for national success,” As we observed about
the often-quoted Kennedy pledge, these and many
parallel declarations by George W. Bush were sincere
expressions of the core liberal values of American
national culture. In addition, as with the Kennedy
Inaugural, they signaled a serious policy mood and,
at least by implication, the character of future national
security strategy.
Before confronting the apparent and the real
range of American choice over its future national
security policy, it is necessary to make three general
observations on the nature and character of policy.
First, there is the fundamental matter of definition.
This monograph insists that policy is restricted to
the purposes to which national agents, civilian and
military, are committed with variable enthusiasm.
To risk muddying the water a little, as a preliminary
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matter it is appropriate to recognize the common sense
in the trinitarian explanation that policy is “capabilities,
declarations, and actions.”80 In other words, policy is
what one can do. No matter how elevated the authority
of their utterer, words cannot convey policy if, logically
and plausibly, they are contradicted by the evidence
of capabilities and behavior. The trinity “capabilities,
declarations, and actions” was not offered by its author,
Morton Halperin, as a scholarly definition of policy, but
rather as a potent dose of realism. Policy should not be
defined strictly by instrumental behavior, but neither
can its merit and authority be unaffected by strategic
choice and operational and tactical prowess.81
Second, while policy can turn on a dime, as the
old saying goes, the major capabilities available to
strategy to advance policy will have lead-times that
typically are measured in several years. One frequent
consequence of this temporal fact of life is that by the
time the capabilities’ answer is reasonably mature, the
strategy and policy question will have changed almost
beyond recognition. By way of illustration, in the 1990s
and 2000s, U.S., other NATO, Russian, and Eastern
European (ex-Warsaw Pact) armed forces were heavily
equipped to perform vanished missions. In addition,
many of those countries were inextricably committed
to the pursuit of military programs less than optimal
for the post-Cold War security environment. The fall
of the Soviet Union was a de facto geopolitical and
geostrategic revolution. But military establishments,
especially in NATO, could not transform themselves
on anything close to the same time scale. Moreover,
given the rapidity with which the political context
can alter, it is probably just as well that material
military conditions most typically shift gradually and
only incrementally. Given the cost and complexity of
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today’s major high-technology military programs, a
true military transformational project could require
several decades to complete. In historical practice,
technical innovation and military postural change are
usually more cumulative than nonlinear.
Third, the range of practical choice in strategy, and
hence policy, at any point in time must be constrained by
physical/material—including human—realities. That
fact is commonly appreciated. Less well recognized,
however, is the easily attestable fact that policy choice
usually is similarly restricted to only a modest pace
of change. It is rare for the policy reviews so beloved
by each new administration to produce anything bold
and original, no matter how dazzling the labels and
extravagant the claims. There are excellent reasons
why this should be so. Preeminently Americans, but
others as well, are moved to decide and behave by
broad motives that are readily summarized in the
Thucydidean triptych of “fear, honor, and interest.”82
Generally speaking, there will be many more, and
more important, continuities than discontinuities from
administration to administration. Permeating and
in good part shaping U.S. choice of national security
policy will be the three most relevant categories of
American culture: public/national, strategic, and
military.83 Scholars will identify extensive U.S. discretion in the selection of its role in the world. Most
of this declared range of policy discretion, however, is
strictly illusory.
To be sustainable, a chosen role in the world and
the national security strategy that supports it have
to be both culturally acceptable at home as well as
successful abroad. Americans are not at liberty to play
which global role they prefer, in whatever manner they
choose. The outside world is always likely to resist, to
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push back. Officially, one must identify the national
role before the national strategy, a batting order
followed here and in the closing section. However, the
role cannot be selected prudently without reference
to feasible strategy. And feasible strategy depends in
substantial part upon the practicality of the necessary
ways, methods, and mobilization of the essential
means. These means will be both material and “moral”
or cultural (e.g., domestic political support, reflecting a
resonance with national values).
Despite the fashionable and sometimes superficially
plausible view that America can choose its preferred
role in the world, we must reiterate that the country’s
freedom of global action in practice is severely
constrained by factors beyond its control. The sources
of this constraint are both domestic and foreign. Other
scholars will design their own short list of alternatives
for the U.S. role in the world of the 21st century. But
however the cake is cut, the total content generally is
the same. The discussion here finds it useful to identify
four master conceptual options for the U.S. role.
1. Hegemony—primacy for global guardianship. This
has been the explicit U.S. choice since 2002. Once
the dust was well settled from the collapse of the
twin towers in New York, the Bush administration
decided that America’s security could be assured only
according to a standard for order operative in a truly
global context. Moreover, this order could be policed
and advanced only if the United States is prepared
to be globally proactive. Washington recognized
that the United States is the sole candidate for global
leadership, the hegemonic role. Also, it concluded
that this role allows, indeed obliges, America to take
the cultural offensive. The world has to be made safe
for democracy, liberty, free enterprise, and free trade.
Not only must the nonstate or rogue state enemies of
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these values be confronted and eliminated, but the
greater states must cooperate with a U.S.-led mission
to improve the world.
2. Anti-hegemonial off-shore balancer and spoiler.
After Iraq, the United States may tire of the onshore hegemonic role in Eurasia, without necessarily
wishing to withdraw from fairly active participation
in global security affairs. As a consequence, as Barry
Posen argues, it should concentrate on exploitation of
its military-technological strengths by domination of
the global geographical and geostrategic “commons”
consisting of the sea, air, space, and cyberspace.84
Events on and in contested and contestable continental
terrain in Eurasia-Africa in particular, Sir Halford
Mackinder’s “World-Island,” would be influenced
both by power exercised from a distance (e.g., naval
firepower and long-range air and missile strikes) and
through local and regional allies. The United States
would strive to remain the most potent state in the
world, but it would not intend to intervene to achieve
continental regime change. Indeed, the country would
be most careful to avoid foreign missions that could
lead to ground commitments, especially ones that
plausibly could become protracted. The U.S. role would
be to serve as an extremely heavyweight potential
ally should a region be menaced by the ambition of
a would-be regional or global hegemon. The United
States would not seek to play global hegemon, but in
its own interest it would intend to spoil the prospect of
hegemonic success for any other great state or coalition.
The U.S. role in the world of anti-hegemonial off-shore
balancer and spoiler is essentially negative. It would
aim to protect America by preventing the emergence
and maturation of a potentially globally dominant
strategic competitor. U.S. continental behavior beyond
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the Americas would be limited to modest assistance
and advice.85
3. Disengaged lone wolf for only minimal participation
in international military security affairs. American
culture has always favored a noticeable measure of
national isolation from the polluting entanglements
of the extra-American world. The United States is not
only culturally an affirmation of faith in a better, even
divinely inspired, society. It is also a cultural rejection
of the “Old World.” Americans know they cannot be
rigorously isolated in North America in this globalized
era. But they are certainly willing to be persuaded that
they have the practical option of massively reducing
their overseas security commitments. With the greatest
army, navy, air force, and, eventually, space forces in
the world, and with an economy and currency upon
which world trade, and hence development and
prosperity, depend, the United States has a “lone wolf”
option. So, at least, it can be argued.
4. Moderate competitor and partner in a multipolar
world. This fourth option is becoming increasingly
popular, even fashionable. It has flourished in reaction
to what is regarded widely as the relatively ineffective
and counterproductive unilateralism of recent U.S.
foreign policy and strategy (national and military).
Also, plausible anticipations of the rise of East and
South Asia relative to North America and Europe
have led many scholars and commentators to believe
that 21st century America is going to have to learn to
coexist with near peers in a multipolar world. Whether
Americans like it or not, the argument goes, the United
States will be obliged to share with others the most
senior security assignment as guardian of global order.
This will not be another “American century.” The only
room for doubt today is whether the United States
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will find itself locked into yet another prolonged and
bilateral superpower struggle, this time with China, or
whether the global competition will be multipolar. It is
almost certainly true that at the present time, influenced
overwhelming by the Afghan and Iraqi experiences, a
large majority of American foreign policy and strategic
commentators believe that the United States: (1) is well
advanced in the process of losing its briefly hegemonic
status; (2) is condemned to pursue a national security
policy and strategy that gives pride of place to multilateral cooperation rather than unilateral action; and
(3) has no choice other to accept as an unwelcome fact
the imminent arrival of a genuinely multipolar (or at
least bipolar) world. There may be more American
scholarly and popular adherents to the vision of a
multipolar than a bipolar security future.
What is one to make of the options outlined above
as candidates for America’s role in the world? This
monograph will risk being out of step with politically
correct opinion by endorsing a variant of the first
option, hegemony-primacy for global guardianship.
Contrary to appearances, perhaps, this is a scholarly
professional judgment, not a visceral patriotic one. In
addition, I am convinced that the continued conduct
of a policy of hegemony-primacy, provided it is
adapted in the light of Iraq and Afghanistan, is the
only practicable and sustainable U.S. policy option
for the future. The prime objection to options one,
two, and three is that none of them will work. Each
is either culturally unsustainable at home in America,
or is near certain to be ineffective abroad, or both. The
role of “off-shore balancer-spoiler” ignores the lessons
of historical experience. The United States will have
foreign continental interests that are deemed vital,
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and those interests can be secured only by a serious
presence on the ground. In the immortal words of a
wise American sailor: “The ultimate determinant in war
is the man on the scene with a gun . . . this is the soldier.”86
Fly-by presence and bombardment from afar cannot
yield the quality of political control that Americans will
find they need. As for the coalition “spoiler” dimension
to this role, it might succeed, but then again it might
not. An America that declines virtually all continental
commitment, even NATO obligations, would not be
likely to succeed as an effective makeweight to assist
regional states in their attempts to frustrate others’
hegemonic ambition.
The “lone wolf” America that elects to withdraw
from active global security engagement would discover
that its attempt to be disinterested in the extra-American world was damaging to the country’s
interests. Also, such an American policy could not
long endure because it would be rejected culturally by
many Americans. Although American culture favors
limited liability abroad, it still demands to be spread
so as to colonize a world that stubbornly remains backward. Almost regardless of material considerations, too
many Americans want to improve the outside world
for wholehearted security withdrawal to be sustainable.
As for the American policy envisaging the country
as a balance-of-power player in a multipolar world, it
is likely to be both unnecessary as well as culturally
infeasible. “Rise of . . .” predictions are generally not
implausible, at least with respect to China and India.
But both seem likely to be regional super-states rather
than global peers of the United States. When one
looks for other “poles” for this hypothetical global
security system, the tale becomes even less convincing
than it is for China and India. For the leading cases,
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Russia has motive, will, and much geography, but it
has systemic weaknesses fatal to its ambitions. Japan
has much of the making of a superpower, but it has
an immense dependency on overseas suppliers, which
is a potentially lethal vulnerability. Chinese naval, air,
and missile power lies athwart the lines of commercial
supply of most of Japan’s oil and gas. EU-Europe could
become a regional and even a global superpower on all
dimensions, but this possibility currently is a light year
from contemporary political and military realization.
Elsewhere, one can cite Iran, perhaps Egypt and Brazil,
but at most they could aspire only to be great in their
own neighborhoods. None appear to bear the promise
of being able to function as one among a handful of
global or supra-regional “poles.”
To conclude this analysis of the future American role
in the world, we must specify the reasons for our choice
of the option one variant “hegemony-primacy-light”
as the preferable master concept for the U.S. role. The
first epigraph of this monograph posed a fundamental
question: “If American hegemony is the answer, what is
the question?” The question is, “Who or what maintains
order in world politics?” If “maintains” is too strong
a term, acceptable alternatives would be “guards” or
“supports.” Two empirically founded assumptions
drive this analysis. First, a reasonably orderly world is
possible only if it is policed by a hegemonic power or
alliance, a leader. Second, at present only the United
States is capable of playing the global hegemonic role.
We specify “hegemony-primacy-light” because the
U.S. role in the world requires each of the three qualities.
To be the leader, the hegemon, the United States
needs to sustain its primacy in several dimensions of
power. Along with a technological long suit, civilian
and military, and the large size of its economy, a
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global leader must be militarily preeminent broadly
speaking, as well as the wielder of potent cultural
soft power. Of course, military preeminence may not
be fully comprehensive, while cultural dynamism
and attractiveness can disappointingly create hostile
alien cultural “blowback.” By specifying hegemonyprimacy-light, we mean that American hegemony has
to be a primacy expressed more in leadership than in
actual application of the mailed fist. The latter will not
succeed if it is the principal weapon in the U.S. strategy
arsenal, nor if it is employed with little discrimination
among cases. American military power is absolutely
essential as the option of last resort, but it is more
potent as threat than it is in action. Force should be
regarded primarily as a vital aid to U.S. hegemonic
statecraft, not as the lifeblood of hegemony. It should
not be America’s default option. “When in doubt, kill
people and inflict damage,” is not a wise precept.
History shows that a world-ordering role needs
to be performed, like it or not. If no state, alliance,
institutional complex, or set of norms and laws operates
to regulate and discipline international behavior, the
result is anarchy. To repeat, the job needs to be done.
As hegemon by self-appointment from a field of only
one, the United States strives to deny operating space
and opportunity for roguish behavior by others. Many
Americans have difficulty with this limited remit,
but the U.S. hegemon can play only an enabling role
on behalf of its values of liberty, democracy, and the
practice of free market economics, it cannot impose
them.
Other states will compete, indeed already are
competing, with the United States. Hegemony is not
a divine bequest which, duly delivered, means the
end of history.87 Currently the United States has a
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lengthy lead in the factors that contribute to national
power, but it is being eroded by the focused efforts of
others, and even by the long familiar historical cycle
wherein polities rise and fall as if by natural causes.
Reasons contributing to a relative American decline
would include “imperial overstretch,”88 the attempt
to do too much with too little, and the jealousy of
others, their “fear, honor, and interest.” Through wise
statecraft and some good fortune America may be able
to stretch its hegemonic moment well into the 21st
century. Alternatively, a combination of foreign policy
defeats, relative economic and financial set-backs, and
skillful anti-hegemonic behavior by rivals, may bring
America’s global leadership to an untimely end. This
would be a great misfortune for the whole world,
because the United States is a distinctly benign hegemon, as hegemons go. And it is far from obvious that
a global security context bereft of American leadership
could possibly be an improvement upon the conditions of today.
It is essential for the makers of U.S. national security
policy never to forget that effective global policing,
in common with all policing, must rest upon a broad
communal consent. Rogues and would-be rogues, state
and nonstate, can be kept in line and if necessary be
forcibly reeducated only if the guardian of order enjoys
the consent, the confidence, of the general community.
U.S. policy for global order does not need a universal
approval, but it must be manifest in goals and behavior
that the generality of players, globally, accept as
legitimate and desirable. In short, in its foreign policy
the United States has to serve a general good as well as
itself.
The hegemonic role in the 21st century has nothing
to do with the acquisition of territorial empire. The
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only empire that interests the United States today is
the support of an expanding community of like-value
polities. The problems with the U.S. hegemonic role
are the product of a combination of human error (e.g.,
cultural hubris) by American policymakers and the
structure of world politics. These are not trivial sources
of difficulty. For a leading example, one can argue that
the United States did the right thing with its invasion of
Iraq, but it did it for the wrong reasons and, in the crucial
opening months after the military victory, mainly in the
wrong way.89 The principal source of difficulty for the
U.S. hegemonic role is the fact that great states are rarely
content to acquiesce in an international security system
organized, led, and reflecting the values and interests
of another power. To name names, China today is not
interested in establishing a global imperium, but it is
firmly committed to the dismantlement of American
leadership and guardianship of global order, most
especially in its own neighborhood in East Asia.90
China may not be overly interesting in fighting to
become Number One, but it is resolute in rejecting the
humiliating status of being Number Two.
As was noted earlier, this monograph is underimpressed with the attractions, either for Americans
or for the world at large, of an emergent multipolar
global security system. A key assumption behind the
multipolar theory has to be that the polar players would
be approximately equal in strength and influence. Also,
it is assumed that in addition to the global players
balancing each other, they would function collectively
if competitively in a manner loosely reminiscent of the
Concert of Europe in the 19th century.91 Leaving aside
reasons to doubt the efficacy of the historical Concert,
such a notion is deeply unsatisfactory for the future.
To summarize the problems with a multipolar 21st
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century: it would be resisted by a majority of Americans,
who are habituated both materially and culturally to
primacy, or at least to preeminence; it would not work
as the leading mechanism for global security; and a
multipolar world would be prone to outbreaks of both
regional and global warfare.
To focus on just one of the problems of multipolarity,
the great power players would each be far more
devoted to improving their own competitive position
than guarding the values and structure of global
security. When no single state is predominant, it can
never be clear who should act to maintain and restore
order. Everyone will try to play “free-rider.” History
and logic demonstrate the truth of this fatal deficiency.
Consider the contemporary cases of North Korea and
Iran. At present, it is unlikely that action will be taken
to disarm either country of its actual or in-process and
forthcoming nuclear weapons. But today, at least, it is
plain beyond doubt exactly who needs to act, should
military action be essential. In a multipolar system,
rogues and other menaces behave as they wish for
a long time, safe in the knowledge that they are the
targets of empty threats and interminable diplomacy.
A multipolar world is a world without a sheriff.
Regarded systemically, the principal function of
a hegemonic power is to undertake those truly hard
tasks that no one else can attempt with a good prospect
of success, even were they willing. The posse will ride
only if it is led by a sheriff. This monograph thus takes
the position that a U.S. decision to acquiesce quietly
in, even encourage, the emergence of a multipolar
world (the United States, China, Russia, India, Japan,
EU-Europe?) would be a serious mistake. A multipolar
security system would not generate security, quite the
reverse. It would not work in the fashion that historyminded theorists anticipate. Even worse, it would
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constitute and promote a context ripe for the return of
great power wars.
Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s do not demonstrate the folly of American global hegemony, or even the
lack of wisdom in a forward strategy for global security.
Instead, these protracted episodes show yet again what
all of history can tell us. Specifically, policy and strategy
errors can be punished severely. Policymakers and
generals make mistakes, in common with the rest of us.
The test of their fitness for responsibility is their ability
to learn from error and adapt.92 America’s mistakes
in Afghanistan and Iraq have been of kinds endemic
to major military interventions in foreign societies
through the ages. Unfortunately, many of those among
us who currently are hostile to the U.S. mission in Iraq,
appeal to nonexistent alternatives for the U.S. role in
the world. Even if one were certain that U.S. policy on
Iraq has been marked by a series of mistakes, it would
not justify a violent swing in national policy. There
is no promising alternative global security system,
just waiting to kick in once Washington abandons its
recent unilateralist tendency. The section that follows
argues that the United States requires the services of
a sustainable national security strategy, rather than
a radical and impractical shift in national security
policy.
The Components of a Sustainable National Security
Strategy.
What is the strategy that could sustain the national
security policy of “hegemony-light?” Put more usefully,
what are the principal components and features of
such a strategy? On the basis of the preceding analysis,
the character of such a strategy has become clear. This
section describes its make-up.
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The U.S. hegemon needs to be able to control the
geographies of the global commons.93 Americans
will have to be free to use the sea, the air, space, and
cyberspace at will, all the while being able to deny such
operational liberty to some other states and political
entities. If this demanding multienvironmental requirement cannot be met, the United States could, and
probably would, be unable to function strategically
as the leading guardian of global order. This role
demands the ability to exercise global access for power
projection, even against sophisticated access denial
capabilities and strategies. For example, attempts by
U.S. airpower to secure and exploit control would
certainly be contested in large areas of continental
airspace. An emerging super-state as well as regional
great powers could mount nontrivial opposition with
well-networked air defense systems. Strategically, the
relative significance of each geography varies from
case to case.
However, given American geography and geopolitics, it is a permanent U.S. geostrategic requirement to command transit, globally by sea and air, as
well as in orbit and through the “infosphere” electronically.94 It has yet to be demonstrated, or even argued
plausibly, that cyberspace is uniquely challenging in some vital regard. Should the control of cyberspace be impossible or only limited, the global sheriff
could find itself unable to function effectively. It
follows that the subject of cyberwar is in need of the
most urgent attention, given current uncertainties
and unknowns. Although control of the commons
is essential strategically, it can be only instrumental.
No one can inhabit these unfriendly environments.
American strategy is indeed blessed with geographical,
cultural, and technological advantages that facilitate
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control, but as British naval historian and theorist Sir
Julian Corbett wrote a century ago:
Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea,
great issues between nations at war have always been
decided—except in the rarest of cases—either by what
your army can do against your enemy’s territory and
national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it
possible for your army to do.95

Technological progress brought airpower, spacepower, and cyberpower, and also greatly enhanced the
potency of the navy in power projection. Nonetheless,
Corbett’s claim retains most of its plausibility. The
American hegemon must use the global commons in
order to achieve distant influence. For that purpose,
some local continental presence is necessary.
To be effective as the global leader or hegemon, the
United States needs to be able to dissuade, deter, and,
if necessary, defeat any rival state or coalition. This is
a hugely demanding role which obliges adoption of
a strategy, and the development and maintenance of
armed forces, that literally must be second to none.
If the United States could be challenged and either
faced down diplomatically on a matter of vital global
interest, or bested militarily, it would not remain
hegemon for long. A regional or even a local power, let
alone a territorially elusive nonstate entity, may prove
impossible to dissuade or deter, as well as difficult to
defeat in combat. Nonetheless, a hegemonic America
must be able to win in regular warfare of all kinds
and at least perform competently and creditably in
irregular hostilities. An occasional defeat is bearable,
provided the country learns from its mistakes. If the
United States were incapable of deterring or defeating
a rising super state, except perhaps with a great deal
of assistance from allies, the global security order
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would have become bipolar or multipolar. A bipolar
or multipolar international order could be stable in
their different ways, but those ways would be judged
undesirable by most Americans. In the medium and
especially the long runs, the United States will have
no choice other than to share its global influence more
and more. However, for reasons already specified here,
such a condition should not be hastened or welcomed.
American national security strategy and forces
must be adaptable. This should be so obvious and basic
a point as to warrant the charge of banality. Strategy
and defense planning are very much about the making
of choices that must impose opportunity costs as well
as benefits. As was noted much earlier, when citing
the conclusions to some excellent historical studies of
peacetime war planning, key decisions on strategy,
doctrine, and capabilities often have to be made in
the face of profound ignorance over the identity of
enemies, the character of future warfare, and—above
all else—the timing of active hostilities.96 Do U.S. forces
need to be able to go literally anywhere, fight anybody,
and win at acceptable cost? For the global sheriff, the
answer has to be “yes,” even though one recognizes
that such a demand for universally successful performance is unrealistic.
Regular conventional warfare currently is
America’s military long suit. Some, perhaps many,
military experts believe that such warfare belongs
only in the past. Technology, culture, and politics have
effectively retired battle between uniformed armed
forces according to this view. The master narrative
for the 21st century is, and will be, “war amongst
the people.”97 At least, this is the fashionable theory.
Obviously, if regular, largely meaning interstate, wars
do not lurk to ambush us in the future, we should not
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expend scarce resources preparing for them. But how
certain can one be that interstate war is obsolete?98 Is
it not likely that the theory of an exclusively irregular
future for warfare reflects nothing much more solid than
a simplistic extrapolation of recent and current history
into an inherently unknowable future? This author is
not persuaded that America’s strategic future will be
strictly confined to conflict with enemies who must
fight in irregular modes. Since the world continues to
be organized and dominated by at least semi-sovereign
states and given that there will be ample issues to fuel
rivalries, it is only prudent to continue to emphasize
the necessity for excellence in regular, if sometimes
asymmetrical, styles of combat.
COIN and CT are important, indeed vital, core
competencies for the U.S. armed forces and other
security agencies. They need to be accepted as permanent missions. This does not mean, however, that
irregular warfare will, or should, dominate America’s
medium- and long-term strategic future. COIN ought
to be a competency which specialized elements of the
armed forces perform well. It is necessary for most
of those armed forces to concentrate on regular, if
asymmetrically-conducted, combat in all geographical
environments. Also, it is important that the United
States not make a habit of undertaking the thankless
task of attempting, in notable part forcibly, to remake
alien societies into “better” places. Because of its liberal
culture, married to apparent opportunity, the United
States cannot eschew being a force for “good” in the
world. But this culturally propelled mission generally
should not be promoted by military activity, at least
not directly. American national security strategy
should be geared to preparation for interstate conflict,
not to enforcing benign regime change in societies
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that Americans scarcely comprehend. The largely
interdependent cultural values of liberty, democracy,
and the free market must be promoted by Americans,
if only because these values are expressions of
American self-identity. To say that, though, is not to
endorse, let alone require, a national security strategy
of liberation and moral improvement abroad. Such a
strategy must fail, because it demands of the agencies
for U.S. policy a cultural effect they cannot deliver,
save rarely. The prudent statesman plays according to
the odds that derive from experience and logic. Success
in the remaking of foreign societies is a mission that
inherently commands only very long odds.
Exploiting their superiority on and in the varied
geographies that comprise the global commons, the
U.S. armed forces need to acquire and perfect what
one can term a decisive raiding capability. Americans
should strive hard to avoid commitment to protracted
and complex operations on land. But they will derive
great strategic, and hence political, advantage from
the ability to intervene in foreign lands swiftly and
decisively on a strike-and-depart basis. It should go
without saying that the adoption of a raiding strategy
as an important component and expression of national
security strategy has to be nested in a holistic approach
to conflict. This is not to suggest that American
soldiers should be employed simply to create brief
mayhem and then leave the mess for others to clean
up. The argument, rather, is that in its policing role as
hegemon-light, the United States should seek to avoid
lengthy land campaigning. Contemporary experience
with Iraq, whatever the outcome may prove to be, is
an exemplar of behavior that the United States should
strive hard to avoid.
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For many years to come, on any plausible assay,
America will remain globally ascendant. But the country
would soon find itself suffering from a severe case of
the malady of “imperial overstretch” that historian
Paul Kennedy popularized in the late 1980s, were it
to make a habit of its Iraqi and Afghan experiences.99
A wise statesman plays to his country’s strengths, not
its relative limitations. The rapid projection of military
power is, or should be, a key American strength. But
to exploit this unique American capability safely,
there is a need for political, indeed even cultural,
discipline. Almost inevitably, military intervention to
solve a pressing security problem invites mission leap,
let alone mission creep, when political temptation is
provided by initial military success.
Because America’s hegemonic strength invites
rivals and outright enemies to compete and fight
asymmetrically, Americans need to sustain not only
technological leadership, but also, of even greater
significance, intellectual leadership in strategic theory
and doctrine. Both ideas and technology matter, but of
the two, ideas matter most. If the United States should
suffer severe military setbacks in the future, most likely
the reason will not be some technological shortfall, but
rather that familiar machines and forces are employed
in unexpected ways by the enemy. Such ways could
reflect military cultural differences between societies,
or they might just be the product of clever strategy
designed to outflank predictable American military
behavior.
To be sustainable, national security strategy must
be truly “national” or “grand.” It is an all too prevalent
error for policymakers to depend narrowly upon the
military dimension to such strategy. Military power
is most potent when its employment remains only
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potential as a brooding possibility. It is a familiar
mistake in statecraft for policymakers to reach for their
gun too rapidly in quest of swift success. Diplomacy
and nonviolent coercion, as well as bribery, can appear
distinctly inferior instruments when compared with the
promise of cutting the Gordian Knot with a quick and
decisive military victory. As we have noted, national
security strategy is a slippery subject. Frequently it is
confused with foreign policy, with military strategy,
or with military operations. National security strategy
must have a domestic as well as an external dimension.
It has to be acceptable to the values of national public
culture, national strategic culture, and militaryinstitutional cultures. At the same time, of course,
the strategy needs to address the country’s foreign
strategic problems effectively. This point amounts to
a reminder that national security strategy has many
components in addition to the military. There has to
be a plausible possibility of armed conflict for an issue
to be addressed by national security strategy, but the
military component need not predominate.
A sustainable strategy will reflect policy goals and
tactical military behavior that do not give gross offense
either to domestic cultural, or to international, norms of
tolerable conduct. The more consent America attracts
abroad, the greater the practical assistance upon which
the country will be able to draw and the more likely
that U.S. policy will succeed.100 If this sometimes
elusive condition is met, American strategy should
prove sustainable.
A vital component of national security strategy is
the dialogue that strategists must maintain both with
policy and with operations and tactics. Strategy is the
bridge between means and ends. If these dialogues are
absent, intermittent, or severely flawed, the prospects
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for national success will not be high. It is only the
strategy function that binds together the country’s
means and ends. Strategists devise the methods, the
“ways,” that enable the coercive agencies, including
preeminently the military establishment, to pursue
objectives that should translate ultimately into desired
political effects. The practical difficulties that commonly
inhibit or frustrate the dialogue component of strategy
are typically underestimated or simply ignored.101 Only
exceptionally are policymakers today well-educated in
military matters, while the military profession can be
disinclined to say “no” to the civil power. In America,
soldiers obey orders from civilians, they do not make
policy. This is an oversimplification, but it remains
the ideal of American civil-military relations.102 In
practice, the strategist must aim to educate the civilian
policymaker as to what the military instrument can
and cannot do. This is vital. Because history is not
strictly linear and predetermined, it will often be
far from obvious just what soldiers might be able to
deliver by way of strategic and political effects. The
theory of strategy says far too little about the subject’s
difficulties. Even the discussion in Clausewitz’s On
War is inadequate.103 For national security strategy to
be successful and sustainable, it has to be nurtured
on a metaphorical bridge. On this bridge, the civilian
policymaker and the professional soldier meet, exchange
information, and, through the alchemy required of the
strategist and strategy, produce coherent and well
directed intentions, sometimes leading to military
action.
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Conclusions and Recommendations.
1. “Hegemony-light” is a policy, not a strategy. The
main reason why the United States should endeavor to
remain the hegemon is the need to play the dominant
role in the endless struggle to support and advance
a world order broadly conducive to America’s vital
interests and friendly to American values, insofar as
that proves feasible. In common with the slippery
concept of security, order has many dimensions,
including the political, the financial-economic, the
environmental-ecological, and the military-strategic.
In addition, world and regional order can be upset by
the consequences of health crises (HIV-AIDS, most
obviously), as the Spanish Flu pandemic of 191819 demonstrated.104 Also, adverse climate change,
uncontrolled population growth in developing countries, and increasing resource shortages—of water,
food, and energy—can and most probably will incite
disorder in all major dimensions of global affairs.
The United States will not be equally dominant in all
aspects of global order, but its policy, strategy, and
actual behavior will be either regnant or at least a
major player in each of those dimensions. This is what
it means to be hegemonic. The world needs leadership
from some sufficient source.
Although U.S. policy on global issues is
often resisted, sometimes effectively, Americans
nonetheless are able to help shape the global agenda
and generally can exercise a potent influence on the
world community’s actions. Washington frequently is
annoyed and frustrated by the unwillingness of others
to be led by U.S. policy choices. But Americans would be
far more frustrated were they either to seek to abandon
the hegemonic leadership role altogether, or to resign
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themselves to functioning within the straitjacket of
near unanimous multilateral consent. Not much would
be attempted, let alone achieved, on behalf of regional
and global order. American hegemonic leadership
does not mean American domination. America may
be dominant, indeed it will need to be dominant in its
ability to persuade, bribe, and, if necessary, coerce. But
it cannot guard global order by a policy of domination.
Such a stance would be regarded very widely abroad
as illegitimate. The predictable absence of international
consent for a U.S. effort to rule by the sword, wielded
by near unilateral U.S. judgment, would be fatal to the
prospects for the American mission on behalf of global
order. Moral authority would be absent.
2. A national security strategy needs a named enemy.
It should remain the U.S. intention to secure its vital
interests, prudently selected, and protect and perhaps
advance respect for its values. But, how is this seemingly
extravagant grand objective to be attempted? What
does hegemonic dominance require by way of, say,
economic strength (measured how?—relative size
of the gross domestic product (GDP) is perhaps the
usual standard, but it encourages oversimplification,
e.g., ignoring size of population)? Or what does such
dominance require by way of military strength, or
some combination of the various elements of national
power? This monograph insists upon the necessity
for the United States to remain militarily ascendant in
nearly all respects in most geostrategic and geopolitical
contexts. But what does this mean for defense planning?
To raise again a most vital question, how will future
wars be fought? Where? Against whom, over what
issues? And, last but not least, when? Will the American
hegemon have to fight total wars of survival, which is
to say wars politically and strategically comparable to
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World Wars I and II and the Cold War? The truthful
answer is that we do not and cannot know.
However, what we do know is that if the United
States is to remain hegemonic on its own as well as
on the world community’s behalf, it must always be
attentive to the well-being of the components of its
national security strategy discussed in the immediately
preceding section. Despite the title and apparent
efforts of the cast of hundreds who produced it, the
impressive annual document, The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America, is more an
educational endeavor than an attempt to promulgate
an actual operational strategy.105 The country cannot
create a strategy to oppose terror. Terror is far too
abstract, not to say diverse and dispersed, to serve as
an enemy. And, to repeat, a definite strategy needs a
specific, targetable enemy. The United States conducts
“war planning” for many contingencies and venues, as
do most states.106 		
For two centuries, powers great and small have
groomed professional military and some civilian staffs,
whose task is to prepare for wars of various shapes
and sizes. But in order to select a dominant strategy,
a country requires of its policymakers that they pick
a dominant foe, at least in those cases when there is
room for discretion. At present, there are several
fairly plausible enemies of a still broadly hegemonic
America, but, with the exception of al-Qaeda and its
affiliates, none quite deserves the dubious accolade
of “designated enemy of the future.” On occasions,
China approaches this dubious status in American
perceptions. However, it is too early to be absolutely
certain that China will become the dominant threat to
the U.S.-led global order of the 21st century, highly
probable though this development seems at present.
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It follows from this analysis that U.S. national
security strategy has to keep its powder dry and
attuned in the face of enormous uncertainty. The scale
of this uncertainty is easily illustrated by reference to
the immaturity of space warfare and cyber warfare, the
current debate over the relative potency of airpower
and ground forces in future contingency missions,
and the slow-motion strategic debates concerning the
future roles of the navy and strategic nuclear forces.107
3. Beware of false alternatives in policy and strategic
choice. Hegemony is a thankless lot, but it can and should
offer solid as well as moral compensation. Moreover, it
can work well enough to support a tolerably acceptable
global order. Multipolarity will not work at all well. It
would be unwelcome to Americans, and it must foster
great power rivalry. Challenges to regional and global
order either will not be met at all or will trigger great
power conflicts. Who leads in a multipolar system?
And if no state enjoys the right to lead that derives from
a recognized, if resented, primacy, how are rogues and
other miscreants to be contained?
American strategy does not face crisp alternatives
between the conduct of irregular and regular warfare,
or between an off-shore or an on-shore Eurasian
continentalist military posture. It is a plain case of
both/and. Often it is claimed with good reason that
strategy is characterized most strongly by the need to
exercise choice. With respect to U.S. military strategy
in the 21st century, as in the past, the country’s first
strategic requirement is for competence in logistics, the
science of supply and movement. Whether Americans
look with most favor upon power projection by fire
or by bodies, the national military strategy has to
be able to direct force over trans-oceanic distances.
Historical experience and common sense tell us not
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to draft an imaginary strategic narrative for the future
out of the events of today and the recent past. This is
the abominable strategic sin of “presentism.” Because
American military professionals cannot know today
exactly what policy will require of them over the next
decades, they must plan on the basis of flexibility,
adaptability, historical experience, and cultural selfknowledge. They should know that there is a much
preferred American way of war that is culturally
founded. It favors high mobility, heavy firepower,
and advanced technology. Americans should be able
to recognize the moral crusader that lurks within
themselves. They are ever tempted either to spread the
gospel of freedom and democracy by any and all means,
or to seek withdrawal from foreign entanglements
when alien cultures resist American tutelage. For
particular cases, America will need specific tailored
strategies. Neither flexibility and adaptability, nor
historical experience and cultural self-knowledge,
comprise strategies.
Occasionally, very occasionally, the United States
will need to engage an elusive nonstate enemy on
the ground in what becomes a COIN campaign.
Americans can succeed at COIN and CT, as they have
demonstrated episodically for the better part of 400
years.108 However, COIN and counterirregular warfare
in general are not the American forte. It is not what
the U.S. military establishment does best. Fortunately,
COIN on a major scale is not asked frequently of
American forces. It follows that high prowess in warfare
against irregulars should not be a prominent feature in
U.S. national security strategy. It would not be prudent.
Almost invariably, COIN success can be achieved
only within a culture by members of that culture.
Americans, Britons, Frenchmen, Russians, and others
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are not competent to wage minimalist “war among the
people,” when the people at issue are culturally all but
unfathomable (e.g., the NATO mission has discovered
that Afghanistan contains no fewer than 60 Pushtun
tribes and 400 subtribes). The United States should not
choose to wage major COIN campaigns very often.109
It will not be likely to succeed. Those Americans most
probably are deluding themselves who today are
predicting a largely irregular future for the country’s
soldiers. American culture on every level will reject the
conduct of irregular warfare as the national strategic
norm.
American public culture detests the moral ambiguity that inevitably attends irregular conflict. Such
conflict typically is protracted, is sociologically and
strategically complex, and does not usually lend
itself to conclusion by decisive military action. Wars
dominated by irregular tactics should therefore be
avoided at almost any cost by the United States. This
does not contradict the necessity for a national security
strategy to develop competence in irregular warfare
that leverages the value of expert military assistance on
a distinctly modest scale, and a broad integrated effort
to enlist help from its civilian agencies. Admittedly, the
latter effort typically is frustrated by the consequences
of the structure of the U.S. Government. Vietnam and
Iraq do not quite constitute a pattern, but viewed
together, they provide stark warning that the possibility
of strategic, and hence political, failure always hovers
near.
4. Never underestimate the influence of culture. There is
an American way of war, and it persists for cultural as
well as material reasons. U.S. national security strategy,
as well as the policy that gives it purpose, is always
going to reflect widespread national assumptions,
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attitudes, preferences, and habits of behavior. Of course,
American strategy must be shaped in part by realities
imposed by the outside world, but perceptions of what
is necessary are apt to be amazingly cultural. Political
scientists enjoy debating the relative significance of the
cultural and the material contexts, but the undoubted
importance of the latter has to be conditioned by
the former.110 Culture is unavoidable even though
Americans are not by any means prudently at liberty to
pick a national strategy entirely at their own discretion.
Some strategies are likely to fail if they do not suit
national military prowess or the character of the threat
and hence of the war. However, even when Americans
are disciplined by such prominent dimensions of
necessity, still they must behave as Americans, with
the only cultural lens that that provides, for net good
or ill in particular cases.
5. American global leadership, or hegemony, will be
challenged. Americans must decide how hard and in
which regards they will compete in order to remain
Number One, but compete they must. Similarly, they
need to decide how energetically they will strive
to achieve a significant measure of international
acquiescence in the more robust aspects of their global
leadership behavior. One can hypothesize the highly
unlikely event that a U.S. president could choose to
eschew expensive involvement in as many global
troubles as possible. He would aspire to settle for
runner-up in the composite power stakes, or at best
for roughly coequal multipolar player. Unfortunately,
perhaps, history is not kind to strategic runners-up.
The logic of global politics is at least partially zerosum. There is an important sense in which it takes
only one competitor for there to be a race for global
influence and prestige. If the United States chooses not
to compete energetically, others will be motivated to
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race harder, not to withdraw and cease active rivalry.
Those theorists are in error who speculate hopefully
about the prospects for a more cooperative, gentler,
kinder (than George W. Bush’s) America, functioning
largely multilaterally in an increasingly multipolar,
but peaceable, world of consensual greater powers.
No such world awaits Americans, no matter how they
behave. If the country is not Number One, it will be
Number Two or lower. Those who believe that that
would not much matter for U.S. national security or
for global order are in urgent need of a history lesson.
This analysis recommends that a sustainable
American national security strategy be directed by
a national security policy of leadership on behalf of
global order. We should reiterate both the global need
for this U.S. role, and the necessity for the substantial
foreign consent vital for its successful practice. Michael
Howard’s 2003 caveat remains pertinent:
American power is indispensable for the preservation
of global order, and as such it must be recognized,
accommodated, and where possible supported. But if it
is to be effective, it needs to be seen and legitimized as
such by the international community. If it is perceived
rather as an instrument serving a unilateral conception
of national security that amounts to a claim to world
domination—pursuing, in fact a purely “American War
against Terror”—that is unlikely to happen.111

In 2008, false perceptions of American world
domination are much in abeyance as compared with
2003. The greater danger today is the possibility that
the United States might retreat unduly from its role as
principal guardian of what passes for global order. The
years 2002-03 may be interpreted as a briefly hubristic

66

imperial moment when, scarcely disciplined by world
realities, American culture appeared to command
policy and strategy. A sustainable national security
strategy can be constructed only from a more modest
portion of that vital ingredient.
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